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INTRODUCTION
All court observers agree that the modern era has brought a dramatic 
decline in jury trials, both civil and criminal.1 The explanations for that
decline are far more ambiguous, in part because commentators offer so 
many possible explanations. To evaluate these sources of decline and to
assess what changes might slow down or reverse the disappearance of the
American jury trial, we conducted a national survey of attorneys and
judges.2 The survey was designed to investigate how legal professionals
who have firsthand experience with the decisions that lead to or away from
1. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 459 
(2004); SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND 
JURIES (2016).
2. This Article reports on results from a survey conducted by the authors at 
the request of the ABA Commission on the American Jury. The materials
contained herein, including the analysis of the results, represent the views of the 
authors and should not be construed as the views of the American Bar Association
or the ABA Commission on the American Jury. Further, nothing contained herein
is to be considered as the rendering of legal advice, and readers are responsible
for obtaining such advice from their own legal counsel.
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2020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL 121
jury trials explain the reduction in jury trials in recent years. This Article
describes the results from this national survey of 1,460 legal professionals,
both attorneys and judges. 
Part I reviews the evidence for the disappearing American jury trial
and discusses the range of reasons that have been offered for the decline.
Part II describes the 1,460 attorneys and judges who participated in the
survey. Parts III through VI use the survey responses to probe how
respondents viewed the potential sources of the declining rate of the jury 
trial.
Part III shows that neither judges nor attorneys viewed either lack of
attorney confidence or lack of attorney competence as deterrents to trial.
In contrast, respondents, particularly judges, viewed litigant preference as
a driver toward settlement rather than trial. Part IV describes how
respondents compared jury trials with other case-resolution procedures.
They ranked jury trials as less predictable, slower, and less cost-effective
than alternative procedures like mediation, arbitration, and bench trials.
Nonetheless, they saw jury trials, second only to mediation in civil trials,
as the fairest procedure and the one they preferred most. This pattern
suggests that perceived risk, costs, and delay deter the use of jury trials
despite their attractiveness on other important dimensions. Part V
examines potential system effects on the reduction of jury trials. The
dominant perceived sources of decline in civil trials were damage caps and
mandatory binding arbitration, with increased summary judgment viewed
as having a more moderate effect. On the criminal side, the dominant
perceived source of decline was mandatory minimums, with defense
attorneys viewing sentencing guidelines and the bail system as additional
drivers of reduced jury trials. Respondents did not see judicial decisions
like Daubert or increased motions to dismiss as influential in reducing jury
trial rates. Part VI considers how respondents weighed in on the role
played by a potential source of the drop in trials that has received little
prior attention: the existence and sources of pressure on litigants to settle
or plead, rather than go to trial. In addition to the litigant’s own attorney,
respondents perceived judges and mediators in civil cases as the major
sources of pressure. In criminal cases, defense attorneys perceived
pressure as coming from themselves, but they identified the judge as a
close second in exerting pressure on the defendant. 
Part VII covers respondents’ evaluation of whether jury trials are 
worth the cost associated with them. The answer was resoundingly 
affirmative from the attorneys and judges in both criminal and civil cases.
Based on the survey results, this Article suggests a series of steps that
should be taken to reverse the recent loss of jury trials. Finally, the Article
348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd  126 12/2/20  7:03 AM




    
   
   
 
     
 
     
 
    
   
     
    
     
  
   
   
     
  
  
   
    
   
 
  
    
    
  
  
    
 
    
  
    
  
        
    
       
         
     
      
122 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
concludes with observations about what will be lost if the health of the
jury system is not restored.
I. THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL AND POTENTIAL REASONS FOR THE 
DECLINE3 
The number of jury trials has dropped so dramatically in recent years
in both federal and state courts that the jury trial is an exceptional rather
than a commonplace outcome.4 Although civil case filings in federal
courts, where the data are most reliable, have increased fourfold since the
early 1960s, the percentage of civil cases disposed of by jury trial
decreased from approximately 5.5% in 1962 to 1.2% by 2002 and to 0.8%
by 2013.5 Likewise, the percentage of federal criminal cases disposed of
by jury trial decreased from approximately 8.2% in 1962 to less than 5%
in 2002 and to 3.6% by 2013.6 In states that maintain accurate records of
bench and jury trials, jury trial rates also declined. From 1976 through 
2002, civil jury trial rates fell from 1.8% to 0.6% in courts of general
jurisdiction in the 22 most populous states, while felony jury trial rates 
declined from 3.4% to 1.3%.7 Bench trials have not taken the place of jury
trials. Rather, the trial itself has been disappearing.8 
In 2001, the American Bar Association convened a symposium for
academics and practitioners to examine the causes of declining jury trial
rates. The participants at the symposium identified a number of potential
factors for civil cases. One factor was the emergence of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) procedures. Some forms of ADR offer a formal process
in which a neutral mediator ostensibly can facilitate settlement
negotiations by designing a more mutually agreeable case outcome sooner
and at less cost than a jury trial would produce. Arbitration offers a quasi-
adversarial process in which litigants present information about their
respective positions to a privately retained expert, usually a lawyer, who 
then decides the case based on established legal principles. Many courts
offer ADR on either a voluntary or mandatory basis.
3. See Paula Hannaford-Agor, Jury System Management in the 21st
Century: A Perfect Storm of Fiscal Necessity and Technological Opportunity, in
THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 505 (Peter M. Koelling
ed., 8th ed. 2016); Shari Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, The Contemporary
American Jury, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 239 (2018).
4. Galanter, supra note 1, at 459.
5. Id. at 462–63; THOMAS, supra note 1, at 2.
6. Galanter, supra note 1, at 493; THOMAS, supra note 1, at 2.
7. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 2.
8. Galanter, supra note 1.
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1232020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
In addition to court-annexed ADR, many commercial litigants began
including binding arbitration clauses in standard contracts. Initially,
litigants implemented these clauses on a peer-to-peer basis between parties
with relatively equal bargaining power, as a way for sophisticated litigants
to ensure reasonably expeditious resolutions of any disputes that might
arise in the future and to enable them to keep the results of the resolutions
private. Increasingly, however, such clauses have become standard in a
wide variety of employment and consumer contracts, such as credit card
agreements, cellular telephone agreements, utility contracts, and 
residential leases.9 Although some courts initially ruled that binding
arbitration clauses were contracts of adhesion and thus unenforceable
under state law, more recent case law from the U.S. Supreme Court has
greatly expanded the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act to
preempt state law in cases involving interstate commerce.10 The push by
employers and other commercial actors to include arbitration clauses in
their contracts appears to be rational. On average, workers who pursue
legal claims through arbitration are less likely to prevail, and they receive
smaller awards than those who pursue employment claims in court.11 What
is key about this trend toward arbitration is that it explicitly deprives
potential litigants of the right to a formal public trial by a jury or a judge.
A number of U.S. Supreme Court cases have interpreted the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in ways that
have tended to shift decision-making on factual issues from juries to
district court judges. In a trio of cases decided between 1993 and 1999, the
Court responded to concerns about the reliability of expert evidence by
endorsing a judicial-gatekeeping requirement.12 Historically, assessments
of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded to expert evidence
were the sole responsibility of the fact-finder at trial. The Daubert trilogy 
interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs the admissibility
of expert opinion as trial testimony, to require trial judges to make a
9. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration
Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-
everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/X37C-HM5F].
10. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
11. Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The arbitration
epidemic: Mandatory arbitration deprives workers and consumers of their rights,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-
arbitration-epidemic [https://perma.cc/GW46-K4VC].
12. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 597 (1993); Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1996); Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999).
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124 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
pretrial determination that the expert’s evidence satisfies established
scientific principles before it may be admitted at trial. Many but not all
states followed the Supreme Court’s lead and adopted the Daubert test.
Because most civil cases and a large proportion of criminal cases now rely
heavily on expert testimony, many commentators viewed the decisions as 
a substantial infringement on the right to a jury trial under the Sixth and 
Seventh Amendments.13 
Commentators have also suggested that the increased use of
dispositive motions, especially summary judgment motions, to decide
cases pretrial has reduced the rates of civil jury trials in federal courts.
Summary judgment is a procedural option that authorizes the trial judge to
determine whether “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.”14 In other words, the trial judge “decides whether
factual inferences from the evidence are reasonable, applies the law to any
‘reasonable’ factual inferences, and as a result makes the determination as
to whether a claim could exist.”15 Although scholars debate why summary
judgments have increased in the modern era, approximately 19% of cases
filed in federal court are now disposed of by summary judgment.16 State
courts, however, have not adopted the federal approach, and summary
judgments account for only 1% of civil dispositions in state courts.17 
Another area of civil case law that has altered the right to trial by jury
involves the standard for granting motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted.18 For most of the 20th century, 
pleading requirements in federal court and in most state courts required
only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.”19 In a pair of cases in 2007 and 2009, the U.S. Supreme
Court changed the standard for deciding a motion to dismiss. Previously,
federal trial courts had to assume that the claim alleged in the pleadings
13. Brandon Boxler, Judicial Gatekeeping and the Seventh Amendment: How
Daubert Infringes on the Constitutional Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 14 RICH. J. L.
& PUB. INT. 479 (2011).
14. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
15. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L.
REV. 139, 143 (2007).
16. Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in
Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 861 (2007).
17. Paula Hannaford-Agor et al., The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State
Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 19–23 (2015),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/13376/civiljusticereport-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/94VB-9REU].
18. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(b)(6).
19. Id. at 8(a)(2).
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1252020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
was true when considering a motion to dismiss. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, the Court introduced a new requirement, namely, that trial
courts consider the plausibility of the claim, stating that there must be
“enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of [the claim].”20 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court
clarified the role of the trial court in making such determinations by
permitting judges to “draw on [their] judicial experience and common
sense.”21 Critics of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions allege that, like
summary judgment practice, the standards for deciding motions to dismiss
have usurped litigants’ rights to have the merits of their claims decided by
a jury.22 
Some observers have also attributed the drop in civil jury trials to a 
variety of tort reform initiatives. Statutory changes such as caps on damage
awards, especially for general compensatory damages like pain and
suffering and for punitive damages, have reduced the ability of litigants
and their attorneys to recover substantial awards of compensatory and
punitive damages.23 Such limits potentially encourage early settlement or
may even lead potential claimants to forgo pursuing their claims entirely.
Many of these initiatives received favorable receptions in state and federal
legislatures in response to sophisticated public relations campaigns by
organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Tort
Reform Association, the American Legislative Exchange Commission,
and other pro-business entities that claimed the urgent need to curb 
unpredictable, irrational, and excessive jury verdicts. There is little support
for that claim, but as Marc Galanter so wisely observed, “[L]itigants 
respond not to what is happening in the courts but to what they believe is 
happening.”24 
Criminal jury trial rates have also declined in both state and federal
courts. Plea bargaining has become the primary, almost exclusive, 
outcome for a criminal charge. As Justice Kennedy recognized in Lafler 
v. Cooper, plea bargaining dominates the criminal justice system: “Ninety-
seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state 
20. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
21. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
22. Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010).
23. For example, Ohio caps non-economic damages at either $250,000 or
three times the amount of economic damages, whichever is greater, with a
maximum of $350,000 per plaintiff and $500,000 per occurrence. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2315.18 (West 2019).
24. Galanter, supra note 1, at 517.
348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd  130 12/2/20  7:03 AM




     
   
    
   
  
  
   
     
 
    
  
  
   
   
   
   
 
 
    
    
    
 
      
  
  
   
   
     
  
       
      
    
 
  
      
  
      
   
    
  
     
    
 
  
126 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”25 This pattern led him to
conclude that “criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas,
not a system of trials.”26 The most commonly cited cause of the drop in
jury trials in criminal cases has been the development of sentencing 
guidelines in the 1980s and 1990s in many states. Most states have
followed the approach of the federal sentencing guidelines, which provide
a downward departure for defendants who accept responsibility for the
offense as part of a plea agreement.27 Many commentators have 
characterized this practice as a “trial penalty” imposed on defendants who
opt to exercise their right to a trial by jury.28 For example, in 2012, the
average sentence received by a federal drug offender after trial was three 
times higher than the average sentence received after a guilty plea: 16 
years versus 5 years and 3 months.29 Evidence indicates that judges in state
courts, too, impose lower penalties on defendants who plead guilty and
waive their right to a trial.30 
The mandatory minimums for some federal offenses also increase the
incentive to plead guilty to a lesser charge. Over one-fifth of all federal
offenders in 2016 were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory
minimum penalty.31 In addition, at both the state and federal levels, the
number of diversionary programs for nonviolent offenders that often make
eligibility to the program dependent on the willingness to accept
25. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). Justice Kennedy was
referring to the rates of pleas among all convictions, rather than the rates of pleas
among all indictments, but in light of the fact that trials are far more likely to result
in convictions than acquittals, the plea bargain is the dominant outcome. Id.
26. Id.
27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1.(a) (U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N 2018) (“If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.”).
28. See, e.g., An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How U.S. Federal Prosecutors
Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-
prosecutors-force-drug-defendants-plead [https://perma.cc/PZ27-S8D5].
29. LAURA I. APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (2015).
30. J. Vincent Aprile II, Judicial Imposition of the Trial Tax, 29 CRIM. JUST.
30 (2014); Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and
Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 90 (2005) (finding an average trial
penalty of 44.5 months in state felony cases).
31. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 29 (2017), https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publica
tions/2017/20170711_Mand-Min.pdf [https://perma.cc/N86A-BQHR].
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1272020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
responsibility for the underlying offense create another pathway leading
away from trial.32 
It is not clear which of these possible explanations has significantly
contributed to the reduction in jury trials. Potentially, they have all
influenced how parties evaluate the desirability of a jury trial and the
extent to which procedural obstacles block access. This Article’s survey
provides an opportunity to learn how attorneys and judges gauge the
impact of the factors that can affect the probability of a jury trial. The
respondents are the lawyers whose decisions and recommendations to 
their clients regarding the desirability of a jury trial may drive the trend
toward fewer jury trials and the judges who have a front row seat when
parties decide to forgo a jury trial and whose rulings may affect the
availability of a jury trial to the litigants.
II. SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
We solicited participation from attorneys and judges across the
country, inviting them to go to a website where they could complete the
survey anonymously. In total, 1,460 respondents participated: 173 judges,
70% state and 30% federal, and 1,282 attorneys, 63% who handle
primarily civil cases, 33% who handle primarily criminal cases, and 4%
who did not indicate whether they primarily handle civil or criminal cases. 
The remaining 5 respondents could not be categorized as judges or
attorneys. Respondents who indicated how they learned about the survey 
(n=939) named a variety of sources, including the American Bar
Association (20%); state or local bar associations (7%); other professional
associations and organizations like the American Board of Trial
Advocates and the American College of Trial Lawyers (51%); and 
contacts, typically by email, from colleagues or others (19%). The
remaining respondents (3%) learned about the survey from other sources, 
including legal publications, social media, and conferences. 
The judges in the sample averaged 14 years on the bench, with an
average of 21 years of experience as a trial attorney. The attorneys
averaged 24 years of experience. The respondents do not represent a 
random sample of attorneys and judges in the U.S., but the sample does
consist of a heterogeneous group of on-the-ground sources drawn from a
range of jurisdictions. Although 45% of the sample came from five of the
most populous states—Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, and Texas— 
32. See, e.g., Court Diversion FAQ, VT. ASS’N CT. DIVERSION PROGRAMS, 
http://vtcourtdiversion.org/court-diversion/faq/ [https://perma.cc/FEQ7-JBPX].
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128 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
which account for 29% of the population of the country, respondents came
from every state and the District of Columbia. 
III. WHY CASES DO NOT GO TO TRIAL: ATTORNEY ABILITIES AND 
LITIGANT PREFERENCES
The survey asked both judges and attorneys about attorney abilities
and litigant preferences as potential sources of influence on the decision 
to go to trial.
A. Judges
The survey asked the judicial respondents to indicate their extent of
agreement or disagreement with four potential influences on the decision
to go to trial: whether attorneys generally feel confident in going to trial,
whether attorneys generally are competent enough to go to trial, whether
the typical case does not go to trial because of costs, and whether litigants
generally would rather settle than go to trial.33 On the first three potential
influences, the average responses fell near 3.50, the midpoint of the scale,
between somewhat disagree (3) and somewhat agree (4), with the 
following values: whether attorneys feel confident in going to trial (3.45),
whether attorneys are competent enough to go to trial (4.03), and whether
cost prevents the typical case from going to trial (3.85). Agreement levels
did not vary with the caseload of the judge, whether criminal, civil, or both.
By contrast, the judges’ responses averaged 5.31, between agree and
strongly agree, in response to the statement, “Generally, litigants would
rather settle than go to trial.” In total, 89% of the judges agreed or strongly
agreed with that statement. This result was in contrast to between 16% and 
35% of judges who agreed or strongly agreed with the remaining three
statements. The caseload of the judge somewhat affected agreement with
this statement.34 Judges with a primarily civil caseload tended to agree
significantly more (5.55) than judges who hear both civil and criminal
cases (5.15).35 Those with a primarily criminal caseload did not differ from
the other two groups of judges (5.33).
To examine whether court vacancies were creating backlogs that make
it more challenging to schedule jury trials, the survey asked judges
whether there were vacancies in their court. Of the respondents, 40% said 
33. The judges responded using a 6-point scale, with 1 meaning “strongly
disagree,” 2 “disagree,” 3 “somewhat disagree,” 4 “somewhat agree,” 5 “agree,”
and 6 “strongly agree.” 
34. F = 3.06, p < .01.
35. p < .05.
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1292020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
there were vacancies, but most of those judges (79.2%) said that the
vacancies had no effect on the likelihood of a jury trial; 16.7% of those
judges reported that jury trials somewhat or moderately decreased as a
result, and 4.2% said the vacancies had made a jury trial more likely. 
B. Attorneys
The survey asked the attorney respondents the extent of their
agreement or disagreement with a similar version of the three questions
that judges were asked about influences on the decision to go to trial:
whether they feel confident about taking a case to trial, whether in general
they find other lawyers competent to take cases to trial, and whether in
general their clients would rather settle than go to trial. The same 6-point
scale that was used for the judges also measured the extent of attorney
agreement or disagreement.
The similarities and differences of these responses are illuminating.
Although judges and attorneys gave identical responses in their
evaluations of actual lawyer competence—4.03 by judges and 4.04 by
attorneys—attorneys, not surprisingly, reported feeling more personal
confidence in going to trial (5.01) than judges saw in the attorneys in
general (3.45). The difference may reflect the common overconfidence
effect, in that people tend to overestimate their own abilities.36 
Alternatively, it may accurately characterize the greater confidence of the
experienced attorney respondents, who averaged 24 years in practice. 
Table 1 shows the perceived litigant preferences toward trial 
versus settlement for both judges and attorneys. The other striking 
difference between the judges and attorneys was in their
assessment of the preference of litigants to settle rather than to go 
to trial.
36. Don A. Moore & Paul J. Healy, The trouble with overconfidence, 115
PSYCH. REV. 502 (2008).
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130 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Table 1. Perceived Attitude of Litigants toward Trial versus Settlement
Agreement or Disagreement with the statement:
For judges: “Generally, litigants would rather settle than go to trial.”
For attorneys: “In general, my clients would rather settle than go to trial.”
On both measures, (1 means “strongly disagree,” and 6 means “strongly agree”; neutral 






Judges (n=109) 5.31 89%
Attorneys (n=955) 4.71 63.6%
Civil attorneys (n=624) 4.80 67.4%
Representing:
Plaintiffs (n=262) 4.99ab 72.9%




Criminal attorneys (n=331) 4.54 56.5%
Prosecutors (n=197) 4.53d 53.3%
Defense attorneys (n=134) 4.56cd 61.2%
Note: Different subscripts denote significant differences at p < .05. Means that have the 
same subscript are not significantly different from each other at p < .05. The ns in this 
table and in the figures that follow indicate how many respondents answered the
question.
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1312020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
A majority of respondents agreed that litigants prefer to settle, but
agreement was significantly greater among judges than among attorneys.37 
While 63.6% of attorneys agreed or strongly agreed with that preference, 
the corresponding agreement among judges was 89%, with the averages
being 5.31 for judges, that is, between “agree” and “strongly agree,” and 
4.71 for attorneys, between “somewhat agree” and “agree.” The belief by
both judges and attorneys that litigants prefer to settle may be one reason
why so few cases go to trial. Whether or not the perception is accurate in
describing what most litigants want, it may explain why judges and
attorneys encourage—or pressure—litigants to waive trial and accept a 
settlement or a plea.
Although all groups of attorneys, on average, agreed at least somewhat
that litigants prefer settlement to trial, responses differed based on whether
the attorney handled civil versus criminal trials and, for civil attorneys,
who their clients were.38 Civil attorneys representing defendants did not
agree as strongly that their clients prefer settlement to trial, perhaps
because settlement in a civil case generally means the defendant must pay
some amount in damages.
In addition to the perceived preferences of litigants, other features of
trials may motivate judges and attorneys to encourage litigants to waive
jury trials and opt for other ways to resolve their cases. These include the
alternative methods of case resolution that have been offered, and
sometimes mandated, in recent years.
IV. PERCEPTIONS OF CASE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
Next, the survey examined perceptions of the four primary case 
resolution procedures used in civil cases: arbitration, mediation, jury trial,
and bench trial. For criminal cases, the questions compared reactions to
bench and jury trials.
A. Civil Attorneys’ and Judges’ Rankings of Case Resolution Procedures
The survey asked civil attorneys and judges to rank four procedures
used to resolve civil cases—arbitration, mediation, jury trials, and bench
trials—based on their predictability, speed, cost effectiveness, fairness,
and the respondent’s overall preference for the procedure. The relative 
rankings range from 1 (least predictable, slowest, least cost-effective, least
fair, and least preferred) to 4 (most predictable, fastest, most cost-
effective, fairest, and most preferred). These rankings required
37. F = 31.12, p <.0001.
38. F = 12.41, p <.0001.
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132 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
respondents to make trade-offs. That is, a higher ranking for one procedure
necessarily meant a lower ranking for some other procedure. The overall
results appear in Figure 1.
















































arbitration mediation jury trial bench trial 
Note. Error bars denote standard errors.
Mediation ranked significantly higher than the three other procedures
in predictability, speed, cost effectiveness, and fairness. Respondents also
personally preferred it significantly to both arbitration and bench trials, 
although not to jury trials. This overall pattern suggests one reason why
voluntary forms of alternative dispute resolution are popular. If it is
possible to resolve a dispute voluntarily through agreement between the
parties, then that method of resolution is likely less costly than other
alternatives, and that voluntary agreement increases the likelihood that the
outcome will be satisfactory to both parties who could otherwise go to 
39. The analyses in Figures 1 through 6 include only judges who reported
that their docket consisted primarily of civil cases. We excluded judges who said
their caseload was “roughly even between Civil and Criminal” because the
ranking question did not specify whether the ranking was for civil or criminal
cases, and it included arbitration and mediation, which are not relevant procedures
in criminal cases.
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1332020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
trial. Successful resolution through mediation is more likely when the
parties are not far apart in their evaluation of the value of the case.
Arbitration did not fare as well. Although ranked second on
predictability, speed, and cost effectiveness, and tying with bench trials on 
predictability and cost effectiveness, arbitration dropped to last on fairness
and personal preference. The question did not specify whether the
arbitration was mandatory, as it often is, but the imposition of a decision 
by the arbitrator contrasts with the voluntary agreement of mediation and
may account for part of the stark difference between reactions to mediation
and arbitration. It is unclear whether the same contrast would have
occurred if the question had specified that the arbitration was voluntary
and non-binding.
The ranking of bench trials trailed mediation on all measures and
trailed arbitration on speed but significantly exceeded arbitration on
fairness and general preference of respondents. 
How then were jury trials perceived? They ranked lowest on
predictability,40 speed, and cost effectiveness, but they ranked
significantly higher than both arbitration and bench trials in fairness.
Further, on personal preference, respondents on average ranked juries at
2.91 out of 4, which is not significantly different from the ranking they
gave to mediation (3.18). 
We also tested whether the rankings of these features varied depending
on who did the rating, comparing four groups of raters: civil judges,
plaintiff attorneys, defense attorneys, and civil attorneys who work with
both plaintiffs and defendants. There was substantial agreement across
groups on the relative ratings of the procedures, but some differences
emerged. Figures 2 through 6 show the results for each of the five features,
beginning with predictability in Figure 2.
40. It is worth considering what the relatively lower rates of perceived
predictability of jury trials mean. One process may be highly predictable but
unfair because it is consistently likely to produce a biased result, whereas another
may be less predictable because, particularly in the close cases that are more likely
to go to trial, it is hard to predict before trial who will prevail because both sides 
have a chance.
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134 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Figure 2. Predictability According to Different Rater Groups
Note. Error bars denote standard errors
When responses were averaged across different rater groups, the case 
resolution procedures elicited different rankings for predictability.41 There
were, in addition, some differences in the degree to which groups
distinguished among the procedures.42 Although all groups ranked
mediation as the most predictable procedure and juries as least predictable,
judges rated arbitration as significantly more predictable than did 
attorneys who represent only plaintiffs or both plaintiffs and defendants.43 
The judges correspondingly ranked jury trials as significantly less
predictable than did all other respondent groups.44 Defense attorneys
ranked bench trials as significantly less predictable than did all other
groups.45 
In summary, there was an overall consensus that mediation is more
predictable and jury trials less predictable than other case resolution
procedures, with civil judges viewing arbitration as particularly
41. Overall difference by procedure, F(3, 1692) = 245.92, p < .0001, ηp 2 = .31.
42. Interaction between procedure and rater group, F(9, 1692) = 3.71, p <
.0001, ηp 2 = .02.
43. p = .01.
44. All ps ≤ .004.
45. All ps ≤ .02.
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1352020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
predictable and juries as particularly unpredictable, relative to the attorney
respondents.
Figure 3. Speed According to different Rater Groups
Note. Error bars denote standard errors.
When responses were averaged across different rater groups, the case
resolution procedures elicited different rankings for relative speed.46 More 
specifically, all groups thought that mediation was the fastest, followed by
arbitration, then bench trials, and then jury trials as the slowest form of
case resolution.
Groups differed modestly on the degree to which they perceived each
case resolution as speedy.47 Defense attorneys ranked arbitration as
significantly faster relative to trials, both bench and jury, than did plaintiff
attorneys.48 Although all groups ranked the four case resolutions similarly,
plaintiff attorneys were more optimistic about the relative speed of bench
trials than the other attorney groups.49 Further, defense attorneys viewed
jury trials as relatively slower than did plaintiff attorneys.50 
46. Overall difference by procedure, F(3, 1671) = 574.41, p < .0001, ηp 2 = .51.
47. Interaction between procedure and rater group, F(9, 1671) = 3.07, p =
.001, ηp 2 = .02.
48. ps < .0001.
49. ps ≤ .04.
50. p = .03.
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136 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
In summary, there was a consensus on average that jury trials are
slower than other forms of case resolution, with defense attorneys seeing
jury trials as particularly slow relative to plaintiff attorneys.
Figure 4. Cost Effectiveness According to Different Rater Groups
Note. Error bars denote standard errors.
As with predictability and speed, when responses were averaged
across different rater groups, the case resolution procedures elicited
different rankings of their relative cost effectiveness.51 More specifically,
all groups thought that mediation was the most cost-effective, followed by
arbitration and bench trials, which ranked similarly. All groups ranked jury
trials to be the least cost-effective. 
Groups differed somewhat on the degree to which they perceived each
case resolution procedure to be cost-effective relative to other
procedures.52 Plaintiff attorneys viewed arbitration as relatively less cost-
effective than did other groups,53 and defense attorneys rated bench trials
as relatively less cost-effective than did plaintiff attorneys and judges.54 
Plaintiff attorneys ranked jury trials to be relatively more cost-effective 
51. Overall difference by procedure, F(3, 1692) = 395.00, p < .0001, ηp 2 = .41.
52. Interaction between procedure and rater group, F(9, 1692) = 6.38, p <
.0001, ηp 2 = .03.
53. ps ≤ .02.
54. ps ≤ .02.
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1372020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
than did all other groups,55 whereas civil judges ranked jury trials to be
relatively less cost-effective than did all other groups.56 
In summary, there was a consensus on average that jury trials are
relatively less cost-effective than other forms of case resolution
procedures, although plaintiff attorneys were more positive about the
jury’s cost effectiveness, and civil judges were particularly skeptical
compared to other groups.
Figure 5. Fairness According to Different Rater Groups
Note. Error bars denote standard errors.
Across groups, the average perceived fairness differed for the different
procedures, and the order of their ranking differed from the orders for
predictability, speed, and cost effectiveness.57 More specifically, the
respondents ranked mediation as the fairest, but that ranking was followed
by jury trials, and then bench trials, with arbitration judged as the least fair
of the procedures. 
This overall pattern is qualified by the fact that groups differed
somewhat in the degree to which they perceived the fairness of each case
resolution procedure relative to other procedures.58 Plaintiff attorneys
55. ps ≤ .02.
56. ps ≤ .03.
57. Overall difference by procedure, F(3, 1680) = 113.24, p < .0001, ηp 2 = .17.
58. Interaction between procedure and rater group, F(9, 1680) = 7.72, p <
.0001, ηp 2 = .04.
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138 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
viewed arbitration as even less fair than did other groups.59 Groups did not
differ on their relative ranking of mediation. Plaintiff attorneys ranked jury
trials to be relatively fairer than did all other groups,60 whereas civil judges 
ranked jury trials to be relatively less fair than did all other groups.61 
Defense attorneys rated bench trials as relatively less fair than did all other
groups.62 Civil judges ranked bench trials as fairer than other groups did,
which may explain the judges’ relatively lower ranking for both jury trials
and arbitration.
In summary, each group of attorney respondents perceived jury trials
as less fair than mediation but fairer than arbitration—and about as fair on 
average as bench trials. There was variability among the rater groups,
however. In contrast to the other groups, judges did not perceive jury trials
as fairer than arbitration. Moreover, whereas judges rated bench trials as
relatively fairer than jury trials, the attorney groups tended to rate jury
trials as fairer than bench trials. 
Figure 6. Overall Preferences of Rater Groups
Note. Error bars denote standard errors.
The rankings of preference were more similar to the rankings of
fairness than to the rankings of predictability, speed, and cost
59. ps ≤ .01.
60. ps ≤ .02.
61. ps ≤ .02.
62. ps ≤ .002.
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1392020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
effectiveness. When averaging responses across the rater groups, the
different case resolution procedures elicited different preference
rankings.63 The order was the same as for perceived fairness. Mediation 
ranked as the most preferable, followed by jury trials, and then bench
trials, with all groups ranking arbitration as their least preferred option.
Although averaging answers within respondent groups produced the
same overall ordering of procedure preference for each group, the
respondents differed somewhat on the strength of their preference for each
method of case resolution.64 Plaintiff attorneys ranked mediation as
significantly more preferable than did defense attorneys and plaintiff-and-
defense attorneys.65 All groups ranked jury trials as similarly preferable. 
Regarding bench trials, attorneys representing both plaintiffs and
defendants ranked bench trials as significantly more preferable than did
plaintiff attorneys and defense attorneys.66 Further, plaintiff attorneys
ranked bench trials as significantly more preferable than did defense
attorneys.67 Although all respondent groups ranked arbitration as least
preferable, plaintiff attorneys ranked it as significantly less preferable than
did all other groups.68 
In summary, although the respondents ranked jury trials as the least
predictable, slowest, and least cost-effective procedure, attorneys on 
average viewed jury trials as second only to mediation as the fairest form
of case resolution. All respondent groups, both judges and attorneys, on 
average viewed jury trials as second only to mediation as the most
preferred form of case resolution.
B. Ranking of Predictability, Speed, Cost Effectiveness, and Fairness as
Predictors of Overall Preference
To further understand what drives a preference for jury trials, we
tested the legal professionals’ rankings of the predictability, speed, cost
effectiveness, and fairness of jury trials as simultaneous predictors of
overall preference for jury trials.
The overall model explained 62% of the variance in overall preference 
ratings.69 Participants’ ranking of the fairness of jury trials was the
63. Overall difference by procedure, F(3, 1695) = 120.22, p < .0001, ηp 2 = .17.
64. Interaction between procedure and rater group, F(9, 1695) = 3.72, p <
.0001, ηp 2 = .02.
65. ps ≤ .02.
66. ps ≤ .04.
67. p ≤ .04.
68. ps ≤ .02.
69. F(4, 557) = 85.76, p < .0001.
348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd  144 12/2/20  7:03 AM




    
  
   
     











    
     






          
         
           
   
  
    
 
140 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
strongest predictor of their overall preference for jury trials.70 The fairer
they thought jury trials were, the more likely they were to rank them as 
more preferable overall. Their ranking of the predictability of jury trials
was also a significant but weaker predictor of their preference for jury
trials.71 Ratings of speed and cost effectiveness were unrelated to overall
preferences for jury trials.72 
In summary, overall preference for jury trials appears to be driven by
concerns about procedural and distributive justice,73 such as fairness and
predictability, and not by practical concerns, such as speed and cost.
C. Criminal Attorneys’ and Judges’ Rankings of Case Resolution 
Procedures
The survey also asked attorneys and judges with criminal trial
experience to rank a set of potential case resolution procedures in terms of
predictability, speed, cost effectiveness, fairness, and overall preference.
However, given that attorneys and judges in criminal trials typically do not
deal with arbitration or mediation, the analysis included only their
rankings of whether bench trials or jury trials were higher on each factor.
The analysis also tested whether these rankings depended on who did the
ranking, comparing judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Figure 7
shows the rankings on the four factors by rater group. Figure 8 shows the
overall preference rankings of each rater group.
70. B = .53, SE = .04, t = 14.12, p < .0001.
71. B = .15, SE = .05, t = 2.99, p = .003.
72. Speed: B = .04, SE = .07, t = .58, p = .56; cost effectiveness: B = .05, SE
= .05, t = 1.04, p = .30. 
73. Kjell Törnblom & Riël Vermunt, Towards an Integration of Distributive 
Justice, Procedural Justice, and Social Resource Theories, 20 SOC. JUST. RES.
312 (2007).
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1412020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
Figure 7. Rankings on Predictability, Speed, Cost Effectiveness, and Fairness by
Rater Groups
The vast majority of the respondents who dealt with criminal cases
ranked bench trials as more predictable, speedier, and more cost-effective
than jury trials, and this result did not differ by group.74 All groups ranked
juries as fairer than bench trials, but the extent of the advantage they gave
to the jury on fairness depended on who did the ranking.75 More
specifically, defense attorneys ranked jury trials as fairer than did criminal
judges and prosecutors.76 Judges and prosecutors did not differ. As with
civil trials, a positive judicial evaluation of the bench trial may reflect the
natural tendency for judges to view themselves in a positive light, but
despite that inclination, two-thirds of the judges viewed the jury trial as
fairer than the bench trial in criminal cases.
74. Predictability: χ2 (2, N = 396) = 4.08, p = .13; speed: χ2 (2, N = 357) =
4.25, p = .12; cost effectiveness: χ2 (2, N = 356) = 1.40, p = .50.
75. χ2 (2, N = 337) = 22.08, p < .001.
76. Defense attorneys versus judges: χ2 (1, N = 163) = 11.43, p = .001; 
defense attorneys versus prosecutors: χ2 (1, N = 274) = 20.66, p < .0001.
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Figure 8. Rankings on Preference by Rater Groups
As with the rankings on fairness, all three groups preferred jury trials
to bench trials, but the degree of that preference depended on the group.77 
More specifically, defense attorneys preferred jury trials more than did
judges and prosecutors.78 Judges and prosecutors did not differ
significantly.
In summary, as with civil trials, although the majority of criminal
attorneys and judges ranked jury trials as less predictable, slower, and less
cost-effective than bench trials, they viewed them as fairer. The majority
of criminal attorneys and judges preferred a jury trial to a bench trial, and
this preference was strongest among defense attorneys.
D. Ranking of Predictability, Speed, Cost Effectiveness, and Fairness as
Predictors of Overall Preference
To evaluate which factors were driving the overall preference of
respondents for jury trials, a regression analysis tested the legal
professionals’ ranking of the predictability, speed, cost effectiveness, and
77. χ2 (2, N = 349) = 22.18, p < .001.
78. Defense attorneys versus judges: χ2 (1, N = 167) = 5.97, p < .01; defense
attorneys versus prosecutors: χ2 (1, N = 285) = 22.08, p < .0001.
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1432020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
fairness of jury trials as simultaneous predictors of overall preference for
jury trials.
The overall model explained 17% of the variance in overall jury
preference ratings, which was statistically significant.79 Participants’
ranking of the fairness of jury trials was the strongest and only significant
predictor of their overall preference for jury trials.80 If a respondent
thought that jury trials were fairer than bench trials, they were 5.71 times
more likely to prefer a jury trial than a bench trial. None of their opinions
about other features such as predictability, speed, and cost effectiveness
were associated with their overall preference for jury trials.81 In summary,
the overall preference for criminal jury trials over bench trials appears to 
be driven by concerns about fairness.
The results of the survey to this point suggest that attorneys are
competent and confident about going to trial, and that attorneys perceive
juries as fair and prefer them overall, except when compared to mediation
in civil cases. The results also suggest that cost and perceived litigant
preferences lead cases away from being resolved by juries. The next
question is whether additional features of the civil and criminal justice
systems have also altered the appeal of the jury trial.
V. SYSTEM EFFECTS AS SOURCES OF THE REDUCTION IN JURY TRIAL 
RATES
Both court decisions and legislative actions have potentially changed
access to jury trials. The survey included questions probing the extent to
which the organizational features of the legal system that have changed in
recent years have played a role in reducing the rate of jury trials.
A. System Effects as Sources of the Reduction in Civil Jury Trial Rates
The survey asked all of the judges and attorneys who try civil cases to
evaluate the effects on jury trial rates of five actual or claimed system
changes: damage caps, mandatory binding arbitration, increases in
successful summary judgment motions, increases in successful Daubert
motions, and increases in successful motions to dismiss. In each instance,
the survey asked: “Do you think that [the system change] has led to a
reduction in the number of civil jury trials?” Respondents could choose
79. χ2 (4, N = 414) = 48.00, p < .001.
80. B = 1.74, SE = .30, Wald = 34.57, p < .0001, OR = 5.71.
81. Predictability, B = .51, SE = .62, Wald = .68, p = .41, OR = 1.67; speed, 
B = -.29, SE = .58, t = .25, p = .62, OR = .75; cost effectiveness, B = 1.86, SE = 
1.10, t = 2.88, p = .09, OR = 6.43.
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“no reduction” (0), “a small reduction” (1), “a medium reduction” (2), or 
“a large reduction” (3). As Figure 9 below indicates, respondents viewed 
the different changes as having different effects on the number of jury 
trials. 


































   
 
     
 
  
   
  
  





   
   







Mandatory Increase in Increase in Increase in 
Binding summary successful granting 
Arbitration judgment Daubert motions to 
(n=666) (n=647) motions dismiss 
(n=584) (n=640) 
Note. Error bars denote standard errors.
For the question of damage caps, the analysis included only those
respondents who said they practiced in jurisdictions with damage caps.
Overall, respondents indicated that damage caps and mandatory
binding arbitration have had the greatest influence in reducing jury trial
rates, on average approaching medium reductions (1.74 and 1.67, 
respectively). More than half of respondents perceived each of these two
features as causing medium or large reductions in the rate of jury trials,
61.6% for damage caps and 52.1% for mandatory binding arbitration. 
These results comport with the practical and economic realities of
mounting a jury trial. Damage caps limit the incentive for plaintiff
attorneys both to accept cases and to assume the costs necessary to take
them to trial by reducing the opportunity to obtain substantial
compensation at trial, even if the case warrants that compensation in light
of the defendant’s behavior and the plaintiff’s injuries. In addition, access
to a jury trial is limited when binding arbitration is mandatory.
The respondents also perceived increases in summary judgment on
average as causing more than a small reduction (1.26) in trials, with 39.9%
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1452020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
seeing the trend as causing a moderate or large reduction. There is some
controversy over whether judges have granted summary judgment motions 
more frequently in recent years, but these survey results suggest at least
some sense among civil attorneys that summary judgment is more likely,
which may fuel a willingness to settle early rather than to push toward
trial.
In contrast to the other three procedures, respondents perceived
increases in successful Daubert motions and motions to dismiss as having 
small or no effects in reducing jury trials. Although a minority of
respondents saw both as causing moderate to large reductions in jury
trials—22.8% for Daubert motions and 21.2% for motions to dismiss— 
the majority evaluated the effects as small at most. As with summary
judgment, there is some controversy over whether rates of successful
motions to dismiss have indeed risen, but as with mandatory arbitration,
decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court have endorsed greater use of both
summary judgment and motions to dismiss.82 
The survey also asked respondents more generally about the effect of
tort reform measures. It asked whether tort reform measures had been
enacted in the respondent’s jurisdiction. Although 9.9% of respondents
were unsure, 72.1% reported that tort reform measures had been enacted.
The survey then asked those respondents who indicated that tort reform
measures had been enacted in their jurisdiction to describe the tort reform
measures that had, in the respondent’s opinion, been most responsible for
causing any decline in jury trials. Although respondents described a wide
range of reforms, including medical review panels and limitations on joint
and several liability, more than half explicitly named damage caps. This
response to the general, open-ended question, asked before we explicitly
questioned respondents on the effect of damage caps, reinforces the
finding that respondents perceived damage caps as a factor having an
outsized influence on the reduction in jury trials.
Although respondent groups showed some differences in their
responses, judges, plaintiff attorneys, defense attorneys, and attorneys
representing both plaintiffs and defendants all rated caps and mandatory
binding arbitration as the two largest influences on reductions in jury trials,
with increases in summary judgment in the third position, and increases in
Daubert motions and motions to dismiss in last place. Overall, plaintiff
attorneys tended to see all of these system changes as more influential than
did other groups. The plaintiff attorneys attributed particularly high
82. Regarding summary judgment, see, for example, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986). Regarding motions to dismiss, see Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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146 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
influence to damage caps, rating it as the source of more than a medium
reduction in jury trials (2.25), whereas the other three respondent groups
saw caps as responsible for between a small and medium reduction in jury
trials, with judges at 1.35, defense attorneys at 1.29, and attorneys
representing both plaintiffs and defendants at 1.71.
B. System Effects as Sources of the Reduction in Criminal Jury Trial
Rates
The survey asked all of the judges and attorneys who try criminal cases
to evaluate the effects of two system changes on jury trial rates: an increase
in successful Daubert motions and the introduction of mandatory
minimums. In each instance, the survey asked: “Do you think that [the
system change] has led to a reduction in the number of criminal jury
trials?” Respondents could choose “no reduction” (0), “a small reduction”
(1), “a medium reduction” (2), or “a large reduction” (3). As Figure 10
shows, respondents viewed the two changes as having markedly different
effects.














Daubert Mandatory minimums 
judges  (n = 32) prosecutors (n = 150) defense attorneys (106) 
Note. Error bars denote standard errors.
Both judges and attorneys in criminal cases viewed Daubert as playing 
the same role that judges and attorneys in civil cases reported that it 
played. That is, all respondent groups viewed Daubert as having caused
little or no reduction in jury trials. Mandatory minimums evoked a very
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1472020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
prosecutors on average viewed mandatory minimums as responsible for
just under a small reduction in jury trials (0.82), with 25.7% reporting it
played a medium or large role, both judges and defense attorneys saw 
mandatory minimums as markedly more influential. Overall, judges rated
the influence as between a small and medium effect (1.56), but half of
them saw its effect as medium or large. Defense attorneys on average
viewed mandatory minimums as the source of more than a medium
reduction in jury trials (2.41), and 85% of them viewed that effect as
medium or large. The three groups differed from one another
significantly.83 
The substantial weight that defense attorneys gave to mandatory
minimums and the lower weight that prosecutors and judges attributed to
them likely reflect the different positions of those decisionmakers when
contemplating going to trial. Faced with a mandatory minimum if
convicted, the defendant must decide whether it is worth taking the chance
of going to trial when the penalty if convicted will be predictably and
unavoidably harsh. The alternative of pleading guilty to a lesser charge
that carries no mandatory minimum and that instead leads to a reduced
sentence is the harsh choice the defense attorney and defendant must
make. Although the overall perceived effect of mandatory minimums is to 
deter going to trial, in some cases a mandatory minimum may actually
increase the likelihood of a trial. If the prosecutor is unwilling to offer a 
reduced charge that will take a mandatory minimum off the table, then the 
defendant may have nothing to lose by going to trial. In general, however,
mandatory minimums provide the prosecutor with a powerful tool that is
likely to induce the defendant to plead guilty, thereby waiving the right to
a jury trial.
The survey also examined perceptions of three other features of the
justice system that might influence jury trial rates: sentencing guidelines,
the bail system, and racial disparities in charging and sentencing.
Respondents evaluated whether each feature had caused a reduction to or 
an increase in jury trials on a 7-point scale ranging from a large reduction
(-3) to a large increase (+3), with -2 indicating a medium reduction, -1 a
small reduction, 0 no reduction and no increase, 1 a small increase, and 2
a medium increase. As Figure 11 shows, respondent groups differed in
their evaluation of how these features have affected jury trial rates.
83. F = 83.8, p < .001 (post hoc comparisons among groups all ps < .001).
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Figure 11. Effects on Jury Trial Rates of Sentencing Guidelines, Bail Systems, and 









   
 
 
    
         
    
  
    
  
   
  
     
    
   
  
 
     
     
     
     


























Sentencing Bail system Racial disparities in 
guidelines charging and 
sentencing 
Judges (n = 25) Prosecutors (n = 106) Defense Attorneys (n = 92) 
Note. Error bars denote standard errors
Overall, averaging responses across groups, respondents perceived
each of the three features as responsible for a modest decline in jury trial
rates, with sentencing guidelines at -.94, the bail system at -.57, and racial
disparities at -.30. All groups agreed that the three features have affected
the reduction in jury trials to different extents.84 Averaging across groups,
respondents viewed sentencing guidelines as more influential in reducing
jury trials than the bail system,85 and the bail system as more influential in 
reducing jury trials than racial disparities.86 Defense attorneys saw each
feature as a greater driver of trial reductions than did judges and
prosecutors.87 Judges and prosecutors did not differ significantly overall.88 
Moreover, although defense attorneys thought all features were
drivers of trial reductions, they rated sentencing guidelines as a








84. F(2, 440) = 12.39, p < .0001 (main effect of feature).
85. F(1, 234) = 8.49, p < .01.
86. F(1, 282) = 9.25, p < .01.
87. Both ps < .0001.
88. p = .39.
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1492020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
system.89 Their ratings of the bail system and racial disparities as sources
of reductions in jury trials did not differ significantly. 
This section of the Article described how respondents evaluated the 
influence of features of the formal legal system on jury trial rates. On the
civil side, respondents viewed damage caps and mandatory binding
arbitration as the two most influential system features, followed by
increased summary judgment. On the criminal side, respondents viewed
mandatory minimums as the dominant force, with defense attorneys
perceiving sentencing guidelines as a key additional driver of reduced jury
trials. Respondents did not see judicial decisions like Daubert or increased
motions to dismiss in civil cases as influential in reducing jury trial rates.
Less formal sources may also reduce jury trial rates by leading a party
to waive a jury trial. These sources, considered next, may exert pressure
on civil litigants to settle and on criminal defendants to plead guilty.
VI. PRESSURES ON PARTIES TO SETTLE OR PLEAD GUILTY
Pressures on litigants to waive the right to a jury trial may operate
through the actions of official actors in the legal system, such as judges
and attorneys, or through the influence of more informal sources, such as
business associates or family members. To explore the perceived role of
pressure in influencing litigant decisions, the survey began by asking
respondents to indicate the extent to which pressures were likely to occur
and then to rate how often they arose from various sources. 
A. Pressures on Civil Litigants to Settle
The survey asked civil judges and attorneys two questions about the
likelihood that litigants are pressured to settle, with one question
concerning plaintiffs and the other concerning defendants. Specifically,
the question read: “Do you believe [plaintiffs/defendants] are pressured to
accept a settlement, thereby waiving a jury trial?” Respondents recorded
their answers on a 5-point scale, with -2 indicating “definitely not,” -1 
“probably not,” 0 “might or might not,” 1 “probably yes,” and 2 “definitely
yes.” Figure 12 shows the different patterns of perceived likelihood of
pressure on plaintiffs and defendants.
89. p <.05.
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Pressure on Plaintiffs   Pressure on Defendants 
judges (n=64) 
plaintiff attorneys (n=249) 
defense attorneys (n=227) 
both plaintiff & defense attorneys (n=131) 
Note. Error bars denote standard errors
All four groups perceived plaintiffs as somewhat likely to receive
pressure to settle, although the groups differed significantly in their
estimates of how influential that pressure was.90 The significant difference
in perceived pressure on the plaintiff between respondent groups arose 
from the different responses of the plaintiff and defense attorneys, with the
former perceiving significantly greater pressure than the latter.91 Judges
and attorneys representing both sides did not differ from each other or
from either of the other groups.
The pattern for defendants was different. The groups differed in their
perceptions of whether defendants were likely to receive pressure to
90. F = 4.10, p < .007.
91. p < .006. 
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1512020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
settle.92 Judges were neutral regarding the likelihood of pressure on 
defendants, whereas plaintiff attorneys saw defendants as somewhat
unlikely to be subjected to pressure, and defense attorneys saw defendants
as somewhat likely to be subjected to pressure. Operating from different
vantage points, the attorneys are exposed more directly to the sources of
pressure that impinge on their own clients. Thus, it may be that the
pressures on defendants are not as visible to judges and especially not to
plaintiff attorneys. That explanation may be why the attorneys who
represent both plaintiffs and defendants, like the defense attorneys,
reported some likelihood, albeit less, that defendants are subject to 
pressure.
The overall pattern is consistent with the fundamental attribution error,
or the tendency for people to under-emphasize situational explanations for
the behavior of others.93 In the litigation context, a failure to recognize the
presence and influence of these external forces may distort negotiation, 
making the other side appear more powerful and in control than they
actually are. 
B. Who Pressures Civil Plaintiffs to Settle?
The survey gave respondents who indicated that plaintiffs were
probably or definitely likely to be pressured to accept a settlement a list of
seven potential sources of pressure. These sources were their lawyer, the
judge, family members, friends, mediators, court staff, and business
associates. The survey did not specifically ask about pressure from
insurers, but respondents had the opportunity to identify other sources of
pressure in addition to the seven on the provided list. 
Figure 13 shows how often each of these respondent groups indicated
that the seven listed potential sources exert pressure on plaintiffs to accept
a settlement.94 
92. F = 33.86, p <.001.
93. Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions
in the Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY. 173 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977); D.L. Hamilton, Dispositional 
and Attributional Inferences In Person Perception, in ATTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL
INTERACTION 99 (John M. Darley & J. Cooper eds., 1998).
94. Respondents who had previously responded that pressure might or might
not occur or that it definitely or probably does not occur were treated in this
analysis as not having identified any of the seven potential sources as exerting
pressure.
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judge (n = 64)
plaintiff attorney (n = 249)
defense attorney (n = 225)
both plaintiff & defense attorney (n = 131) 
Across groups, respondents on average perceived that some sources
were significantly more likely than others to exert pressure on plaintiffs to
settle.95 They perceived that a plaintiff’s attorney was significantly more 
likely to apply pressure than were mediators.96 The plaintiff’s attorney was
followed closely, however, by the judge and mediators as sources of
pressure according to all groups, with one exception: judges did not see
themselves or their fellow judges as a frequent source of pressure. The
judicial respondents rated judges as exerting significantly less pressure
than did all other respondent groups.97 The other groups did not differ from
one another in their impressions of the likelihood that judges exert pressure
on plaintiffs. On average, respondent groups viewed family members and 
95. F(6, 3990) = 124.74, p < .0001, ηp2 = .16.
96. F(1, 665) = 20.56, p < .0001, ηp2 = .03.
97. All ps ≤ .01.
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1532020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
other unofficial sources as playing a less frequent role.98 Court staff were 
rarely identified as sources of pressure.
C. Who Pressures Civil Defendants to Settle?
The survey also gave respondents who indicated that defendants were
probably or definitely likely to feel pressure to accept a settlement a list of
seven potential sources of pressure. These sources were their lawyer, the
judge, family members, friends, mediators, court staff, and business
associates. The survey did not specifically ask about pressure from
insurers, but respondents had the opportunity to identify other sources of
pressure in addition to the seven on the provided list. 
Figure 14 shows how often these respondent groups indicated that
each of the potential sources exerted pressure on defendants to accept a
settlement.99 










the judge family 
members 














judge (n = 64)
plaintiff attorney (n = 249)
defense attorney (n = 227)
both plaintiff & defense attorney (n = 131) 
Averaging across respondent groups, respondents perceived some
sources as significantly more likely than others to exert pressure on civil 
98. All ps < .04.
99. See supra note 94.
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154 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
defendants to settle.100 Overall, respondents viewed defense attorneys,
judges, and mediators similarly as the major sources of pressure, all of
them significantly more likely than business associates to exert pressure.101 
In turn, they saw business associates as significantly more likely to exert
pressure than family members and friends, with family members more
likely to exert pressure than friends.102 They rarely saw court staff as
sources of pressure.
Perceptions of some sources of pressure differed, however, depending
on the respondent group. In general, the plaintiff attorneys viewed the
defendants as subject to fewer sources of pressure than did other attorney
groups.103 The defense attorneys and attorneys who represent both 
plaintiffs and defendants viewed judges as significantly more frequent
sources of pressure on defendants than did plaintiff attorneys and
judges.104 As with plaintiffs, judges rarely saw themselves or fellow judges 
as sources of pressure on defendants; they attributed pressure most often
to the defense lawyer and secondarily to mediators.
Although the survey did not specifically ask about pressure from
insurers, 1 in 10 defense attorneys explicitly identified insurers as a source
of pressure. In civil litigation, insurance companies are often crucial
decisionmakers, both in hiring the attorneys and in approving settlement
offers and agreements, so it is likely that they would have been cited even
more frequently if the survey had specifically included them in the set of
potential sources of pressure.
In summary, the respondents saw both plaintiffs and defendants in 
civil cases as subject to pressure to settle. Overall, the most prominent
sources of pressure were the litigant’s own attorney, judges, and
mediators. The pressure from mediators is understandable in that a 
mediation that ends without agreement is often characterized as a failure,
and the mediator needs to get all of the parties to accept a suggested
outcome in order to finalize it. The legitimacy of pressures from the judge 
are more ambiguous. These results also reveal that the different
participants see the pressures from different perspectives, minimizing
themselves as sources of pressure and failing to recognize sources of
pressure on opponents. 
100. F(6, 4002) = 66.96, p < .0001, ηp2= .09.
101. F(1, 667) = 42.14, p < .0001, ηp2= .06.
102. Business associates versus family: F(1, 667) = 4.45, p = .03, ηp2= .01;
family versus friends: F(1, 667) = 18.22, p < .0001, ηp2= .03.
103. ps < .01.
104. ps < .01.
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D. Pressure on Criminal Defendants to Plead Guilty
The survey asked judges and attorneys who handle criminal cases
about the likelihood that defendants feel pressure to plead guilty.
Specifically, the question read: “Do you believe defendants are pressured
to plea bargain, thereby waiving a jury trial?” They recorded their
responses on a 5-point scale, with -2 indicating “definitely not,” -1 
“probably not,” 0 “might or might not,” 1 “probably yes,” and 2 “definitely
yes.” Figure 15 shows how the three groups assessed the perceive pressure
on criminal defendants to plead guilty.





















Note. Error bars denote standard errors
Overall, the average perceived pressure was above the scale midpoint,
at .41, but the three groups of respondents differed significantly in their
ratings.105 Whereas the judges averaged just slightly above the neutral
point on the scale at .14, defense attorneys on average rated pressure as
substantially likely, averaging 1.48, that is, midway between “probably 
105. F = 110.39, p < .001.
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156 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
yes” and “definitely yes.” Prosecutors, in contrast, tended to reject the
view that defendants are pressured to plead guilty, averaging -.22. The
large difference between the prosecutors and defense attorneys, -.22 versus
1.48, was significant, as was the lesser gap between the judges and defense
attorneys.106 
E. Who Pressures Criminal Defendants to Plead Guilty?
The survey gave respondents who indicated that defendants were
probably or definitely likely to be pressured to plead guilty a list of six
potential sources of pressure. These sources were their lawyer, the judge,
family members, friends, court staff, and business associates. The survey
did not specifically ask about pressure from the prosecutor, but
respondents had the opportunity to identify other sources of pressure in
addition to the six on the provided list. 
The survey asked each of these respondents which of the potential
sources they thought exerted pressure on defendants to plead guilty.107 
Figure 16 reflects their responses.
106. ps < .001.
107. See supra note 94.
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judge (n = 42) prosecutor (n = 208) defense attorney (n = 132) 
Overall, respondents perceived some sources as significantly more
likely than others to exert pressure on criminal defendants.108 Respondent
groups agreed that the most frequent source of pressure on the criminal
defendant to plead guilty was likely to be the defense attorney. They
perceived the defense attorney to be a significantly more likely source of
pressure than family members and judges, who did not differ from each
other.109 Respondents perceived judges to be a significantly more likely
source of pressure than friends.110 They perceived friends as significantly
more likely to exert pressure than court staff.111 Few respondents 
perceived pressure from court staff and business associates.
The groups differed markedly, however, in their perceptions of some
sources of likely pressure.112 Roughly half of the defense attorneys saw
themselves (52%), as well as the judge (50%) and family members (45%),
108. F(5, 1895) = 61.04, p < .0001, ηp2= .14.
109. F(1, 379) = 24.44, p < .0001, ηp2= .06 (defense attorney versus family
members); F(1, 379) = 2.74, p = .22, ηp2= .004 (defense attorney versus judge).
110. F(1, 379) = 4.15, p = .04, ηp2 = .01.
111. F(1, 379) = 36.99, p < .0001, ηp2= .01.
112. F(2, 379) = 1.21, p = .30, ηp2= .01.
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158 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
as sources of pressure. Prosecutors were significantly less likely to see the
defense attorney as a source of pressure (23%) than were defense
attorneys.113 Judges did not significantly differ from either prosecutors or
defense attorneys in their impression of the defense attorney as a source of
pressure.114 
In assessing the likelihood of judicial pressure, defense attorneys rated
judges as significantly more likely to exert pressure than did prosecutors
and judges,115 who did not differ from one another. The difference between
defense attorney and judicial raters on the judge as a source of pressure is
particularly dramatic: while 50% of defense attorneys saw the judge as a
source of pressure, only 5% of judges reported that the judge was a
probable source of pressure on the defendant to plead guilty. The extent to
which judicial pressure actually occurs cannot be assessed from these
perceptions, but it may well be that judges are not conscious of the extent
to which their well-intentioned offers of advice are perceived as pressure
by defendants and their attorneys. 
With respect to other sources of pressure, the defense attorneys
reported a greater likelihood of pressure than did other raters. Defense
attorneys rated family members as significantly more likely to exert
pressure than did prosecutors or judges,116 who did not differ. In addition,
defense attorneys rated friends as exerting significantly more pressure than
did prosecutors,117 while the judges did not differ significantly from either
of the other two groups. The potential costs of a conviction on family and
friends may account for pressure from these sources, which the defense
attorney would be more likely to learn about than the judge or the
prosecutor.
Although the survey did not specifically ask about prosecutors, one in 
three defense attorneys explicitly identified the prosecutor as a source of
pressure. Sentencing system features, such as sentencing guidelines, harsh
sentences, and mandatory minimums, were mentioned by 6.8% of defense
attorneys, 2.3% of judges, and 0.5% of prosecutors.
In criminal cases, defense attorneys present a distinctive picture of
pressures on the defendant to plead guilty coming from multiple sources. 
Some of those sources are informal, such as family members, but the most
frequently identified sources were formal: judges and attorneys. The
legitimacy of pressures from those formal sources depends on whether the
113. p < .0001.
114. ps ≥ .13.
115. ps ≤ .0001.
116. ps ≤ .0001.
117. p = .001.
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1592020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
pressures assist defendants in achieving an optimal outcome, or merely
induce them to surrender their right to trial.
VII. ARE JURY TRIALS WORTH SAVING? (AND IF SO, WHAT NEEDS TO 
BE DONE?)
Through their answers to the survey questions, judges and attorneys
made it clear that they viewed other case resolution procedures as more 
predictable, faster, and more cost-effective than jury trials. However, they
also said that jury trials excel in terms of fairness and that they personally
prefer jury trials to alternatives. Indeed, the reports in the survey responses
from judges and attorneys on the reasons that led to their last jury trial
indicate that the parties turned to juries in those trials to resolve precisely
the types of conflicts that demand the judgment of a third-party neutral
decision-maker that has the level of legitimacy commanded by a jury.
Examples of these reasons included: “There was a fundamental difference
on how the parties viewed the significance of the undisputed facts,” 
“Defendant physician believed that he had done nothing wrong and felt
settlement was the wrong thing to do,” and, “My client was innocent of
the charges.” Thus, there are trade-offs to consider in evaluating how much 
effort is worth investing in resisting the disappearance of jury trials. 
Accordingly, the survey asked respondents to indicate the extent to
which they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “Jury trials
are worth the costs associated them.” Using a 6-point scale, where 3.5 was
the midpoint, the result was clear: every group of respondents, whether
judges or attorneys, whether trying criminal or civil cases, and whether
representing plaintiffs, the government, or defendants, on average viewed
jury trials as worth the costs associated with them. Figure 17 shows the
extent of agreement for each respondent group.
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Figure 17. Agreement/Disagreement that Jury Trials Are Worth the Costs 
Associated with Them 
 
(1 = “strongly disagree,” 2 = “disagree,” 3 = “somewhat disagree,” 
4 = “somewhat agree,” 5 = “agree,” 6 = “strongly agree”) 
Jury Trials Are Worth Their Cost 
4.7 
5.26 















Civil Cases Criminal Cases 
Judges (civ. = 63; crim. = 41) 
Plaintiff Attorneys (241); Prosecutors (n=206) 
Defense Attorneys (civ. = 224; crim. = 126) 
Attorneys who represent plaintiffs or defendants (n = 130) 
Note. Error bars denote standard errors
Respondents did differ in how valuable they perceived jury trials to
be.118 Plaintiff attorneys tended to be more favorable toward jury trials 
than attorneys who sometimes or always represented defendants.119 
Moreover, in criminal cases, judges and defense attorneys were more
favorable toward jury trials than prosecutors.120 The striking finding,
however, is that 79.1% of civil respondents and 87.7% of criminal
respondents expressed agreement that jury trials were worth the costs
associated with them.
The survey results also suggest that a number of features of the modern
legal system deter litigants and their attorneys from taking their cases to
118. For civil cases, F = 3.52, p < .02; for criminal cases, F = 26.40, p < .001.
119. Versus defense attorneys, p < .007; versus attorneys who represent both
sides, p < .02.
120. ps < .001.
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1612020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
trial before a jury. If jury trials are indeed worth protecting, steps need to
be taken to eliminate or modify the features responsible for the recent drop
in jury trials. Several key sets of features stand out. The first, on the civil
side, are damage caps and mandatory binding arbitration. Damage caps
undermine the willingness of attorneys to accept cases, and they encourage 
settlement to avoid the costs of trial. Mandatory binding arbitration cuts 
off court access even more directly. To the extent that eliminating these
features is not a practical possibility, courts and legislatures could at least 
raise the level of existing caps and move toward making arbitration 
voluntary rather than binding.
In criminal cases, a second set of features discourages defendants from
exercising their right to a jury trial. Mandatory minimum sentences and
sentencing guidelines that incorporate severe presumptive sentences and
include coercive incentives to plead guilty strengthen prosecutors’ 
bargaining power as defendants and their attorneys contemplate the
prospect of going to trial. Sentencing guidelines were originally
introduced to reduce unwarranted disparity in sentencing. However, their
effect in some instances has been to ratchet up penalties and increase the
defendant’s incentive to waive the right to a trial. The elimination of
mandatory minimum sentences and a review of the severity of sentencing
guidelines with an eye toward lowering the range of sentences, whether
mandatory or advisory, would reduce the leverage that prosecutors
currently have to extract guilty pleas and deter defendants from seeking
trials.
The survey results also suggest that, however unintentionally, judges
in both civil and criminal cases are perceived as a substantial source of
pressure on litigants, inducing them to settle or plead guilty rather than to
go to trial. One explanation for this push from judges may be their strong
perception, revealed in the survey, that litigants generally prefer to settle
rather than go to trial.121 It is worth testing the accuracy of this perception.
If it is accurate, then there is an argument that judges are simply assisting
litigants in obtaining what they want. Further, it may be that active judicial
participation in criminal cases acts as an important check on prosecutorial
power in plea negotiations. Nonetheless, in addition to lacking the
transparency of a trial, pressures to produce a plea may impose significant
costs, particularly on innocent defendants,122 and in effect deny all litigants
the fairness of having their day in court. 
121. See supra text accompanying note 31; see also supra Table 1.
122. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1979 (1992); see also Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent 
Defendant's Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining's
Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013) (reviewing the
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162 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
The survey did produce some evidence that judicial pressure can be
avoided or at least reduced. Sixteen states prohibit judicial involvement in
the plea-bargaining process.123 The survey results allowed a comparison
of the evaluation of judicial pressure by respondents from states with and
without such a judicial prohibition. For criminal defense attorneys, the 
difference was dramatic: the 25% reporting judicial pressure in prohibiting
states rose significantly to 59.8% in non-prohibiting states.124 
The favorable responses of the survey respondents to the fairness and
desirability of jury trials, and the conclusion from all groups of legal
professionals that jury trials are worth the costs they impose, suggest that
measures should be taken to reverse the recent downward spiral in the
prevalence of jury trials. The responses from the survey point to the 
potential changes that are needed, including eliminating or raising the level
of damage caps, jettisoning mandatory arbitration, reforming sentencing
guidelines, and abolishing mandatory minimums. More information is 
needed about the nature and effects of judicial participation as well as the 
actual preferences of litigants, but the judicial role too may call for
adjustment.
CONCLUSION
The results from this survey reveal substantial goodwill toward jury
trials from judges and attorneys, yet jury trial rates have plummeted. If
efforts are not made to reverse this trend, then the question becomes: What
are we losing? Not only are defendants in criminal cases and parties in
civil cases losing their day in court, with its procedural protections and
access to the decisions of disinterested citizens, but a system with fewer
trials provides less citizen feedback on the justice system. The American
jury trial provides crucial guidance through its effect on cases that do not
end up before a jury. For example, reporters of jury verdicts have
traditionally supplied attorneys in civil cases with a wealth of information
on past jury verdicts, informing them about “going rates” in the attempt to 
reach settlements. Prosecutors consider what a jury would do in evaluating
literature and reporting on an experiment, finding that a majority of innocent
student-participants admitted to cheating in order to avoid academic
consequences); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1037, 1062–63 (1984) (describing how adversarial testing helps to protect
individual and community freedoms from abuses of government power).
123. Tina M. Zottoli et al., State of the States: A survey of statutory law,
regulations and court rules pertaining to guilty pleas across the United States, 37 
BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 388 (2019).
124. χ2 = 13.50, p<.001 (n=132).
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1632020] REASONS FOR THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL
whether to prosecute a case and what incentive to offer for a plea.125 With 
fewer jury trials, the strength of the signal sent by jury verdicts is weaker
and thus less reliable due to fewer data points. The question that remains 
in the wake of this loss is what evidence attorneys and parties will 
reasonably use to assess what the likely outcome would be if the case went
before a jury. Although assumptions about what a jury would do will
persist as a crucial reference point for settlements and plea bargains,
attorneys and the public will be right to wonder whether the assumptions
can be trusted. The problem is that with less feedback from real jury trials,
distorted expectations are likely to proliferate.
Finally, if fewer citizens have the opportunity to participate as jurors, 
this reduction threatens the values of a deliberative democracy, including
the educative benefits that Tocqueville recognized126 and the stimulus 
toward civil engagement and political participation that Gastil and his
colleagues recently demonstrated.127 It is ironic that the decline in jury
trials in the United States has been occurring at the same time that several
other countries have moved toward implementing jury trials and other
forms of lay participation in trials as a way to increase the legitimacy of
their legal systems.128 
125. Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
1071 (2019).
126. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans.,
2002) (1835).
127. JOHN GASTIL, E. PIERRE DEESS, PHILIP J. WEISER & CINDY SIMMONS,
THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 37 (2010) (indicating that prior 
jurors showed an increased likelihood of voting).
128. JURIES, LAY JUDGES, AND MIXED COURTS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 25,
47, 69, 88, 107 (Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, Shari Seidman Diamond, Valerie P. Hans
& Nancy S. Marder eds.) (forthcoming Nov. 2020) (discussing, respectively,
Argentina, Japan, South Korea, and Spain).
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